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Contested Borders, Contested Boundaries: The Politics of Labour 
Migration in Southeast Asia 
Michele Ford 
Temporary labour migration is a contemporary global phenomenon driven by unequal 
economic relations within and between states, but also by conflict, repression and even 
natural disasters. Its strong historical precedents notwithstanding, international labour 
migration has been transformed in recent decades by the ease of transportation, which has 
enabled workers to travel between home and host country (and to second and third host 
countries) on short-term contracts. While clearly of benefit to capital both as a cheap form of 
waged labour and through the role that foreign domestic workers play in the reproduction of 
the local labour force, the presence of large numbers of temporary migrants presents a 
dilemma to host-country governments, which struggle to balance the demands of economic 
growth and the social implications of the decision to import ‘second class’ workers. In an 
attempt to manage these risks, they seek to control flows of migrant workers – in many cases, 
strongly supported by local trade unions concerned with the welfare of their (local) members. 
Southeast Asia, which encompasses key source and destination countries, offers a useful case 
study of the politics of temporary labour migration. The importance of foreign contract 
workers to the economic well-being of both groups of countries has led to contests within and 
between governments over questions of jurisdiction. While facilitating short-term migration, 
governments continue to frame foreign labour primarily as a migration or security issue. 
However, it has become increasingly obvious that large-scale temporary labour migration is 
of great consequence not only in terms of border controls, but also in terms of labour 
relations. Indeed, many of the social and political difficulties that have arisen around the 
rapid growth in this kind of migration have their roots in the ambiguous position of low-
skilled foreign contract workers within the labour markets and industrial relations systems of 
the countries where they are employed.  
This chapter examines the political economy of labour migration in the region, with a focus 
on its implications for collective action. It argues that the pivotal role of temporary labour 
migrants in Southeast Asiaposes intellectual and practical challenges to the way we think 
about work, mobility and the nature and exercise of labour rights both by individuals and 
collectively.  While temporary labour migration is a serious short-term threat to already weak 
trade unions in the region, internationally-driven responses to the challenge it presents also 
offer hope of reinvention and renewal.  If even only partially successful, attempts to broaden 
union constituencies and develop alliances across sectors and national boundaries stand to 
better equip trade unions to deal not only with temporary labour migration but with the other 
challenges to organized labour posed by neoliberalism.1 
Contested borders 
In recent decades, large-scale international temporary labour migration has been a key part of 
the economic and social experience of almost all Southeast Asian states. Within the political 
economy of the region, the position of temporary foreign workers is defined both by the 
landscape of capitalism and by the labour regimes embedded in them. Southeast Asia is 
dominated by developmentalist states that do not provide a comprehensive social safety net 
for their citizens – either because they are either too poor to do so, or because they are 
ideologically opposed to state welfarism. When combined with strong disparities in the level 
of wealth between states and highly stratified labour markets within them, the lack of social 
security becomes an important push-factor, as poor Southeast Asian countries increasingly 
look to temporary labour migration as a means of alleviating pressure on their weak internal 
labour markets. High rates of unemployment and policy frameworks that favour mass 
temporary labour migration drive the citizens of countries of origin like Indonesia and the 
Philippines abroad to destinations in the Middle East and North Asia, and to wealthier 
countries within Southeast Asia itself. Once overseas, these workers provide an important 
source of foreign income. In the case of the Philippines, the national economy has come to be 
heavily reliant on remittances, which in the first quarter of 2010 alone contributed US$4.3 
billion to national earnings (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 2010). Although remittances 
represent a much smaller proportion of the overall economies of other major sending 
countries in the region, they make a significant contribution to foreign exchange earnings and 
a vital part of the economic infrastructure of the particular districts from which large numbers 
of workers migrate. 
Wealthier economies in Southeast Asia rely heavily on these flows of foreign workers to 
support economic growth, providing cheap labour for manufacturing, construction and 
services without the burden of funding the reproduction of labour. Singapore and Malaysia – 
the main regional destinations for Indonesians, Filipinos and Thais, along with many South 
Asians – have extremely tight labour markets. Although Singapore also attracts significant 
numbers of highly paid foreign professionals, in both countries wage differentials between 
skilled and semi-skilled occupations generate strong demand in ‘dangerous and dirty’ 
industries like construction and dock work, but also for domestic workers and carers, whose 
presence permits middle-class women to outsource the work of the household in the absence 
of state-funded facilities for the care of children and the aged (see Ford 2010b). The other 
major destination country in Southeast Asia is Thailand, itself a labour exporter, which 
attracts migrant workers from poorer countries in the Mekong Subregion, including Laos and 
Cambodia, for much the same reasons but also millions of Burmese. 
The financial crisis of 1997 demonstrated the extent to which temporary labour migration has 
become a structural feature in the region. During the crisis, the governments of Malaysia and 
Thailand stepped up efforts to control numbers of temporary labour migrants by closer 
regulation of entry and the imposition of increasingly punitive sanctions against those found 
working without appropriate documents. In Malaysia, a total ban was imposed on new 
recruitment of foreign labour in August 1997, only to be lifted following protests by 
businesses and employers of domestic workers. Although re-imposed in January 1998 for 
workers in the manufacturing, construction and service sectors, the ban did nothing to slow 
flows of irregular migrant workers, and when it was again lifted in mid-1998, numbers of 
regular workers quickly recovered (Kanapathy 2004). The Thai government responded to the 
crisis by launching a campaign to deport migrant workers to create jobs for nationals – an 
initiative that also ultimately failed. In the Tak province near the Thai-Burmese border, for 
example, around 20,000 migrants were deported in the year 2000, but only 6,000 Thais had 
applied for the positions they vacated (Martin et al. 2006: 137-8). All the while, 
undocumented migrant workers continued to enter Thailand from other mainland Southeast 
Asian states. 
This mismatch between pressures for intra-regional labour migration and governments’ 
attempts to regulate flows of foreign workers for social and political reasons serves to 
exacerbate already high levels of undocumented labour. Irregular labour migrants find 
employment in many sectors of the economy in both east and west Malaysia, including the 
plantation sector, construction and services, but also in small to medium manufacturing in the 
industrial states of the west. In Thailand, unregistered migrant workers from Burma, 
Cambodia, Lao PDR and, to a lesser extent, China are found in a broad cross-section of 
occupations in the formal and informal economy. Singapore prides itself on its ability to keep 
irregular labour migrants out but, although more successful than its neighbours, there are 
nevertheless many who enter the city-state illegally for work. It is by definition impossible to 
accurately quantify numbers of irregular labour migrants in the region, but according to 
estimates they constitute up to 40 per cent of the total number of labour migrants in the 
region’s eastern migration systems (Battistella 2002: 8). 
The question of labour migration to Thailand, and to a lesser extent in Malaysia, is further 
complicated by refugee flows. As neither country is signatory to the 1951 United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the governments of Malaysia and Thailand do 
not differentiate between refugees and irregular labour migrants. Yet, in addition to the 
refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border, large numbers Burmese refugees live and work 
in locations throughout Thailand. There is also an increasing presence of Burmese in 
Peninsular Malaysia – which for many years was a primary destination for Acehnese refugees 
– as well as a significant concentration of refugees from the Southern Philippines in the 
eastern Malaysian state of Sabah. In many cases, the distinction between asylum seekers and 
economic migrants is blurred, as the lack of jobs at home is a primary motivation for some 
migrants from areas experiencing conflict. Thus, for example, while many activists argue that 
the flood of refugees to Thailand would slow if the political situation in Burma changed, 
others, like Denis Arnold, argue that even if the military regime were to fall, migration to 
Thailand would continue because employment prospects are so poor (Arnold 2006: 5-6). 
Many asylum seekers who have left their homes in fear of persecution also work in irregular 
situations, particularly in contexts where their refugee status is not recognized. 
Contested boundaries 
In the destination countries of Southeast Asia, the capacity of unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour migrants to access their labour rights depends in part on their location on a continuum 
of legality. Migrant workers’ position on that continuum is determined by a complex range of 
systemic, yet contingent, definitions influenced by a multitude of factors beyond mode of 
entry and status on arrival, including geographical location, country of origin and sector of 
employment, along with the shifting terrain of ever-evolving government policies. Thus, even 
where foreign workers are ‘legal’, in many contexts the conditions of the short-term permits 
with which host country governments issue them limit their activities, for example by 
determining the kind of work they may undertake or proscribing their right to join 
associations. However, temporary migrant workers are excluded from the formal industrial 
relations system not just because they are migrants. They are also excluded because of the 
sectors in which they work. Although immigrant and foreign workers constitute a significant 
proportion of the blue-collar formal sector workforce in some destination countries, most are 
employed on the fringes of the formal sector or in informal sector occupations, that are poorly 
integrated into state industrial relations mechanisms.  
Unlike areas of law that draw on deeply-held socio-cultural values or long-standing practice, 
the regulations governing labour migration are arbitrary, constantly defined and redefined as 
they are by competing legal systems and claims for departmental jurisdiction. As many 
scholars writing about labour migration have emphasized, the categories ‘documented’ and 
‘undocumented’ are almost always fluid. Regular migrants may voluntarily enter into 
irregular status by breaching their visa conditions. However, they may also do so 
involuntarily because of changes within the regulatory framework or because regulations are 
framed in such a way as to give employers the power to jeopardise migrant workers’ status, 
for example by failing to pay a levy, by confiscating travel documents or by forcing workers 
to do work not permitted under their visa conditions. Conversely, irregular migrants may be 
able to regularize their status through regularization programs or by returning briefly to their 
home country, for example during an amnesty, before re-entering the host country with the 
appropriate documents, or by moving to a third country. 
Governments in Southeast Asian source countries create the ‘regular’ channels through which 
low- and semi-skilled labour migrants must pass if they wish to be recognized, and play a 
role in determining the extent to which those regular channels are used. Although labour 
migration flows in the region are shaped to some extent by ethnicity and nationality, it is 
clear that class and skill have been the essential criteria underpinning host country decisions 
to seek to integrate some groups of foreign workers but not others. Unlike highly-skilled 
professionals, unskilled and semi-skilled foreign workers do not have the bargaining power 
required to move freely in the international labour market. Instead, they are constrained by 
home and destination country policies and often punitive bilateral labour agreements reached 
with an eye to facilitating and controlling migrant labour flows rather than ensuring the safety 
and well-being of workers.  
A striking characteristic of temporary labour migration in Southeast Asia is the detailed and 
precise way in which these host states categorize and deal with different groups of people 
seeking to work within their borders. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand all have complicated 
formulas that differentiate between foreign workers on the basis of their mode of entry, but 
also their nationality and in some cases their gender. In Malaysia, regular labour migration is 
not only managed by sector and nationality, but also according to geographic location. As of 
March 2007, the national policy on foreign workers, which regulates labour migration in 
Peninsular Malaysia, permitted employment in export-oriented manufacturing and a number 
of non-export-oriented manufacturing industries. Under this policy, nationals of ASEAN 
countries were permitted to work on plantations and in manufacturing, services and 
construction, central Asians in manufacturing, services and construction, and Indians as 
restaurant cooks, high-voltage cable workers and on the plantations. In addition, Nepalese 
and Sri Lankan workers already employed in Malaysia could be replaced by workers of the 
same nationality where employment fell within specific parameters. In the eastern state of 
Sabah, only Filipinos and Indonesians could be employed, while in Labuan, employers could 
recruit Indonesians, Filipinos, Thais, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis.2 At that time, there was no 
specified list of nationalities for recruitment in Sarawak, where a licence and employment 
quota must be obtained (Immigration Department of Malaysia 2007). 
The supremacy of host countries’ migration regimes does not go entirely unchallenged. 
Sending countries like the Philippines and Indonesia attempt – with varying levels of success 
– to influence the conditions under which their nationals work overseas through bilateral 
agreements and other mechanisms. Interests within the host country itself may also diverge. 
In Malaysia, for example, there are ongoing and quite public tensions between government 
departments concerned with labour and security (Pillai 1999; Turner 2005). Ultimately, 
though, the migration status of semi- and low-skilled labour sets the outer limits of the extent 
to which they are recognized by the host country as workers. 
Yet while migration status determines who is recognized as a worker, it is not the only factor 
shaping access to host-country industrial relations processes and institutions. While generally 
(but not always) better off than their undocumented compatriots, even those who have 
entered a foreign country through official channels and continue to meet migration-related 
regulations seldom receive the same wages and enjoy the same conditions as locals doing the 
same job. Temporary migrant workers employed in the blue-collar formal sector workforce 
of wealthier countries in the region have at best conditional access to basic labour rights, 
including access to decent work, legal redress and the right to freedom of association. In 
addition, many migrant workers are employed in marginal formal sector occupations, or in 
the informal sector, which lies outside the scope of the formal industrial relations system 
altogether. Employed in private homes as domestic or care workers, the bulk of women 
moving for work within Southeast Asia are particularly far removed from industrial relations 
mechanisms. However, the informal sector also includes large sections of the construction 
industry, much of the service sector, and even parts of the manufacturing sector that rely on 
homeworkers or on outsourced labour – occupations that are effectively excluded from 
nationally and locally determined frameworks that set out and attempt to protect labour 
rights. 
The limits of contestation 
Despite its important international dimension, the international labour movement is 
essentially defined at the national and sub-national scales. As a result, like other industrial 
relations institutions, trade unions are ill-equipped to deal with the inherently transnational 
problem of temporary labour migration. Around the globe, trade unions have long been 
hostile towards migrant labour because of the threat foreign workers were seen to pose to the 
interests of ‘locals’ (Haus 1995; Nissen and Grenier 2001; Teicher et al. 2002), particularly 
when migrant labour flows increase or in times of economic hardship. In some contexts, trade 
unionists have recognized that this kind of protectionism is a problematic strategy. As Haus 
(1995) suggests, one of the reasons that US unions did not campaign for restricted 
immigration in the 1980s and early 1990s was that they realized that since they could no 
longer have control over who was employed in a particular industry they needed to be able to 
organize workers regardless of where they were born. Avci and McDonald (2000) make a 
similar argument with regard to British unions, observing that trade unions have become 
more concerned about their ability to organise workers rather than worrying about where 
those workers come from, as the bargaining position of organized labour weakens in the 
increasingly transnational context of the European Union.3 
In Southeast Asia, however, systematic discrimination against temporary migrant labour on 
the part of the labour movement indicates that migration status continues to be more 
important to unions than foreign and local labour’s shared experiences as workers. As a 
result, it has been migrant labour NGOs rather than trade unions that have most often 
responded to foreign workers’ inability to access their labour rights. NGOs’ efforts initially 
focused on service provision, driven by concern about the problems foreign workers 
experience as migrants. However, many NGOs in the Asian region have gradually moved 
from an exclusive focus on service provision and advocacy towards migrant worker 
organizing in the hope of tapping the transformative power of collective action to break down 
structures preventing foreign workers from accessing their labour rights. 
During the course of this organizing work, migrant labour NGOs in northeast Asia became 
increasingly aware of the benefits to foreign workers of gaining access to local industrial 
relations mechanisms, and of their own institutional limitations in that domain – in short, 
recognizing that unions can play a role in the protection of foreign workers’ labour rights, 
both through the national industrial relations system and in the international arena through the 
ILO, that NGOs simply cannot play. This awareness prompted key migrant labour NGO 
networks such as the Migrant Forum in Asia to attempt to recruit local trade unions 
throughout the Asian region to the migrant labour cause. Meanwhile, having acknowledged 
that trade unions’ nationally based constituencies leave them ill-equipped to deal with 
emerging regional and global labour markets, in the early 2000s the international trade union 
movement began to encourage trade unions in other regions to become more proactive on 
migrant labour rights. 
The convergence of interests between the international labour movement and regional 
migrant labour NGO networks created significant momentum for change, pushing Southeast 
Asian trade unions to develop proactive policies on temporary migrant labour. Responses to 
this pressure in the region have necessarily varied in line with local labour movements’ 
different levels of conviction, degrees of commitment and capacity to promote change. In 
Thailand and Malaysia, there is a clear geographical dimension to trade unions’ ability to 
represent migrants, since significant concentrations of foreigners live and work in isolated 
regions and migrant workers are not permitted to form their own unions (a restriction that 
also applies in Singapore). In Thailand, many Burmese workers are employed in purpose-
built factories in the Thai-Burma borderlands, in regions which are of no interest to local 
trade unions. Large numbers of Indonesian migrant workers are employed on plantations in 
the eastern Malaysian state of Sabah, where local trade unions are particularly weak. Equally, 
reliance on local trade unions limits organizing along labour market lines, as most foreign 
workers are employed in poorly-unionized sectors, or in peripheral parts of organized sectors. 
For example, in Singapore, although foreign maritime engineering workers employed by 
large companies like Keppel Shipyard can join a union, most foreign workers are employed 
by non-unionized sub-contractors.  Third, internal politics and external constraints meant that 
local trade unions do not always offer benefits that are attractive to foreign workers, or have 
the capacity to protect recruits from being dismissed for having engaged in trade union 
activities.  
Poorly-resourced and extremely divided, Thailand’s is the weakest of the destination country 
labour movements in Southeast Asia. It is no surprise, then, that migrant labour issues are a 
low priority even for unionists sympathetic to migrant workers. The Thai Labour Solidarity 
Committee (TLSC), which brings together peak bodies representing over 350 trade unions 
with 26 labour NGOs and other labour organizations has demonstrated a strong focus on 
migrant labour issues in its advocacy campaigns, arguing that migrant workers would be 
much less vulnerable to police persecution if they were part of a mainstream Thai union, and 
that Thai unionists have a duty to build solidarity amongst workers regardless of their 
background. In 2010, the State Enterprise Workers Relations Confederation joined with the 
TLSC and the Human Rights and Development Foundation to petition the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants for an urgent inquiry into a proposed 
nationality verification process for Burmese migrants in Thailand, with support from Global 
Union Federations, including Building and Wood Workers International and International 
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions. However, like much of 
Thai society, the majority of trade unionists continue to see foreign workers as outsiders who 
compete for Thai jobs, and Thai unions have been very slow to integrate migrant labour 
issues into their core union work. As a result, grassroots initiatives involving migrant workers 
remain very much the domain of NGOs like the Thai Labour Campaign and the MAP 
Foundation and grassroots migrant worker groups like the Mae Sot-based Yaung Chi Oo 
Workers Association and its rival, the Burma Labour Solidarity Organization. 
Malaysia, the destination country with the largest, most established official labour migration 
programme in the region, has been a particular target for both NGO networks and the Global 
Union Federations. Partly as a result of this international pressure, the Malaysian Trades 
Union Congress (MTUC), which was previously hostile to migrant workers, revised its policy 
position. The MTUC has made efforts to reach out to migrant workers, appointing a full-time 
programme officer to deal with the foreign domestic worker question, seconding another staff 
member half time to deal with migrant workers in other sectors and providing legal support in 
selected cases concerning migrant workers through its industrial relations department.4 
Although support for these initiatives among member unions is patchy, as the public face of 
the Malaysian labour movement, the MTUC’s pro-migrant worker rhetoric has had a 
significant impact in the public sphere. 
There is some cooperation on migrant labour issues between the MTUC and the long-
established migrant labour NGO, Tenaganita, which has been the principle force in both 
advocacy and service provision for migrant workers in Malaysia.5 Grassroots organizing 
programmes have also been initiated by some national sectoral unions, particularly in the 
port, timber and plantation sectors. In the case of the Timber Employees Union Peninsular 
Malaysia, these initiatives have had significant support from Building and Wood Workers 
International, which encouraged the union to develop stronger links with its counterparts in 
sending countries and has funded a full-time organizing position for a Nepalese trade unionist 
to help recruit Nepalese workers in Malaysia. In a different kind of initiative, the Malaysian 
Liaison Council of Union Network International (UNI), another of the Global Union 
Federations, established a migrant labour help desk run by members of its 40 Malaysian 
affiliates to assist foreign workers who experience difficulties. The hotline, which initially 
targeted foreign domestic workers but then was expanded to cover other sectors, fields 
several hundred calls a month from documented and undocumented migrant workers. In an 
attempt to circumvent the government’s policy on migrant labour unions, UNI has also 
sponsored the formation of an Indonesian-registered trade union called Unimig that organizes 
Indonesian workers in Malaysia. 
Singapore’s wealthy, service-oriented trade unions possibly recruit proportionally more 
temporary migrant workers than their counterparts in Malaysia. As all formal-sector workers 
are covered by Singaporean labour law, there is no basis on which companies may 
discriminate against temporary migrant workers; however, as in Malaysia, only unions in 
sectors with a concentrated migrant presence have migrant labour programs.6 In Singapore, 
semi- and unskilled foreign workers are concentrated in the shipping, building and 
construction, manufacturing and services sectors, including domestic work, hospitality and 
retail. The sectoral unions most active in organizing migrants are the Shipbuilding and 
Marine Engineering Employees’ Union (SMEEU), the Singapore Organisation of Seamen 
(SOS) and the Building Construction and Timber Industries Employees' Union (BATU) – in 
the case of BATU and SOS, with strong encouragement from Building and Wood Workers 
International and the International Transport Federation respectively.  
The National Trades Union Congress of Singapore (NTUC), which is closely aligned with the 
ruling People’s Action Party, adopts a very positive public stance on documented migrant 
workers. In the face of rising concerns among Singaporeans about foreign workers, the 
NTUC has also moved to provide concrete services to foreign workers. The most significant 
of these measures has been the establishment in 2008 of a Migrant Workers Centre, which 
provides services to foreign workers in crisis and conducts outreach programs to assist 
foreign workers to integrate better into Singaporean society, such as English-language 
courses and cultural awareness seminars.7 The NTUC also runs programmes to encourage 
employers to take a more responsible attitude towards their foreign employees. However, 
unlike the MTUC, whose migrant labour policy includes advocacy for the ratification of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, the NTUC follows the Singaporean government line, namely that 
ratification of the convention is not necessary as Singapore already has the capacity to ensure 
that foreign workers are protected. 
Conclusion 
When Southeast Asian migrant labour NGOs reached the limits of service provision, they 
followed the example of their Northeast Asian counterparts and began devoting more of their 
resources to organizing. It quickly became clear, however, that while informal groups and 
registered associations could provide support to migrant workers, their capacity to promote 
structural change was limited because they had at best peripheral status within national and 
international industrial relations forums and processes. In a region where no destination 
country permits migrant workers to form their own unions, this left them with little choice but 
to try to bring established trade unions to the table.  
Local trade unions were in most cases at first reluctant  to engage with an issue they saw to 
be  at best peripheral and more often detrimental to the interests of local workers. This 
reluctance in part stemmed from prejudice, but also from the knowledge that it is logistically 
difficult to organize temporary migrant workers in any national context – let alone in ones 
characterized by punitive legal and industrial relations regimes and weak trade unions.  
Nevertheless, with encouragement and material support from the international labour 
movement, local trade unions in the region began to reposition themselves with regard to 
foreign workers, with peak union bodies in Thailand and Malaysia in particular having 
shifted a long way from the overt and hostile rhetoric they had favoured the 1990s. Although 
accommodation of short-term foreign contract labour is necessarily far more difficult at the 
grassroots level, a number of significant examples of concrete programs and strategies exist. 
In short, there has been a dramatic shift in the activist landscape, as trade unions begin to deal 
more seriously with the question of how to organize temporary foreign workers. 
Even when combined with the ongoing campaigns of middle-class migrant labour NGO 
activists, it is important not to overstate trade unions’ power to act as a foil to the industrial 
relations and immigration regimes that control and regulate foreign labour in any region, let 
alone in the developmentalist states of Southeast Asia. The national scale and sectoral biases 
of industrial relations mechanisms means that foreign workers’ ability to join, and be 
represented by, a trade union is contingent on the intersection between their migration status 
and the location of their occupation in the labour market. The temporal limits of their 
contracts make them a poor investment for poorly resourced union organizers who are 
already overstretched. Nevertheless, the momentum generated by the confluence of NGO and 
international trade union interests, with its regional and global dimensions, has generated new 
ways to deal with the inherently transnational problem of temporary labour migration. 
Importantly for trade unions, it has also demonstrated their potential for better dealing with 
the other ‘non-standard’ workers who increasingly dominate all levels of the global 
production system. In doing so, it offers hope – albeit fragile – for the future of organized 
labour in Southeast Asia’s developmentalist states. 
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Notes 
1 This chapter was written as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Project entitled From 
Migrant to Worker: New Transnational Responses to Temporary Labour Migration in East and Southeast Asia 
(DP0880081). The discussion presented here draws on Ford (2006b, 2007, 2010a) and on data collected in 
interviews conducted in the region between 2007 and 2010. 
2 For a detailed discussion of these kinds of processes and their implications, see Ford (2010a). 
3 See, for example, Fitzgerald and Hardy (2010) and Meardi (2008). 
4 Another influential factor was a change in the MTUC’s central leadership. The MTUC took a much more 
sympathetic line on foreign workers after President Syed Shahir bin Syed Mohamud and General Secretary 
Rajasekaran were elected in 2005. 
5 In recent years, several more NGOs have engaged with migrant labour issues in Malaysia. Most service-
oriented and advocacy NGOs with an interest in migrant labour are affiliated with a national network of NGOs 
with an interest in migrant labour and refugee issues called the Migrant Working Group, formed in 2006. 
Besides Tenaganita, the network’s members include the Women’s Aid Organization, the National Human 
Rights Society, the Labour Resource Centre, Suara Rakyat Malaysia SUARAM, Amnesty International 
Malaysia, the Penang Office for Human Development, A Call to Serve, All Women’s Action Society, Shelter, 
the Legal Aid Centre (Kuala Lumpur) and the Malaysian Bar Council. Other NGOs that have had contact with 
the network include Migrant Care and the National Office for Human Development. 
6 Note, however, that not all companies allow the union to represent migrant workers in collective bargaining. 
Of the 45 companies in which the SMEEU has branches, only two have collective labour agreements that cover 
migrant workers. Both of these are foreign-owned companies, and both are in marine engineering, with 
relatively small workforces of around 500. 
7 The centre was established in collaboration with the Singapore National Employers’ Federation and with seed 
funding from the Singapore government. 
                                                          
